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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000306

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [BM](#) [ASSK](#) [NLD](#)

SUBJECT: RAZALI'S TWELFTH VISIT TO RANGOON

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B/D).

11. (C) Summary: On March 5, COM met with Leon de Reidmatten (UN Special Envoy (SE) Tan Sri Razali's man in Rangoon) and got a comprehensive readout of Special Envoy Razali's twelfth visit to Rangoon. The fact that Razali came and twice met with Aung San Suu Kyi is good - as is the news that she is even more open to dialogue with the regime. ASSK wants to be released immediately - if he SPDC continues in the farce that she is not under house arrest or that she is "at home" voluntarily, then it will once again prove its callous insincerity. As to the PM's protests of wanting to do his best to move the road map process along but being hog-tied by Senior General Than Shwe, we should remain skeptical. End Summary.

12. (C) On March 5, COM met with Leon de Reidmatten (UN Special Envoy (SE) Tan Sri Razali's man in Rangoon) and got a readout of Special Envoy Razali's twelfth visit to Rangoon. De Reidmatten was present at Razali's two meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and accompanied the SE to the meeting with Prime Minister (PM) Khin Nyunt (but was not privy to the actual meeting). He also took part in the SE's meeting with U Tin Oo (the senior NLD leader only recently released from prison into house arrest), and accompanied the SE to a meeting with Labor Minister U Tin Winn.

13. (C) De Reidmatten confirmed that Razali had complied with the SPDC's instructions forbidding any formal meetings with diplomatic representatives (read EU and the U.S.). He also said that Razali had requested a second meeting with the PM but it never came about. The SE also requested a meeting with General Maung Aye (the Army Commander in Chief), but the PM said there was no need for this as "Maung Aye is with me." The SE's request for a meeting with SPDC Chairman Senior General (SG) Than Shwe was met with the excuse that the SG was traveling, "probably on purpose", according to de Reidmatten.

14. (C) De Reidmatten emphasized the following points:

- Razali said that the PM wanted a new role for Razali that would move the process forward - he wanted the SE to be more than a "facilitator."
- the PM made "very clear" to the SE that all parties would be invited to participate in the National Convention.
- Razali believes that the PM has "internal problems" in that Than Shwe is an obstacle to moving the process forward.
- the PM has little room to maneuver and is "at the mercy" of Than Shwe.
- the PM said the SE's proposal for a tripartite group (government, NLD, ethnic groups) to initiate a dialogue on the transition process was "premature" and progress could only be made "step by step."
- the PM was anxious to tout progress in the regime's dialogue with ASSK, showing photos of three meetings between her and the Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence, General Kyaw Win.
- The PM made a point that the regime "does not want interference in its dealings with the NLD."

15. (C) De Reidmatten said that Razali's strategy is to "strengthen Khin Nyunt" by getting other countries that have influence with the regime (read Than Shwe) to push for more support for the PM (de Reidmatten suggested that it would be very useful if the U.S. could approach the Chinese to use their influence in this capacity). De Reidmatten provided COM with a draft of the planned March 5 press release by UNSYG Annan which states "The Special Envoy believes that the PM should be given a full mandate to follow through on the transition to democracy."

16. (C) De Reidmatten's readout of the SE's two meetings with ASSK had some highs and lows. ASSK appears to be in fine health and spirits, "better than ever." However, she is frustrated by the fact that although the regime told her in November that she would meet with the PM in December, Than Shwe has blocked the encounter.

17. (C) ASSK also wants out - now! She asked Razali to push

hard for her release, and for the release of the three other members of the NLD Central Executive Committee that remain under house arrest. She said that the SPDC road map is a possible way to achieve change, but unless she is free to work with the NLD leadership there can be no negotiations. De Reidmatten quotes her as saying "after all it (read the NLD) is a democracy even if I am the boss" and that those who claim that remaining under house arrest is part of her political strategy are absolutely wrong. Razali plans to make this clear in the UNSYG statement to be released March 15.

18. (C) ASSK told Razali that she was very supportive of the sanctions and that she had told the SPDC that she was. De Reidmatten said ASSK was angry about the regime's accusations that she was too much under the influence of the U.S. and the U.K., and said that such accusations "were an insult." ASSK also said she was aware of the efforts of the United States and the U.K. on behalf of her, and her party, and was deeply appreciative.

19. (C) ASSK said she recognizes the efforts of the PM and feels that he is trying to move the process along. She said she that she is willing to work with the PM. But, according to de Reidmatten (who knows her very well) the possibility of ASSK and Than Shwe ever having a dialogue is becoming more remote. ASSK will talk to Than Shwe if she has to, but there is so much bad history between them that it will probably not result in anything positive.

110. (C) Moving to the SE's other meetings, de Reidmatten characterized the meeting with U Tin Oo as being more for the purpose of verifying the elderly NLD leader's state of health (good). U Tin Oo was surprised to see the SE - he had been brought to a government guest house by his MI warders and was expecting to see ASSK. U Tin Oo was reluctant to speak on anything other than the events of May 30 (confirming what we all know - it was brutal and government sponsored). As to the meeting with Labor Minister U Tin Winn, de Reidmatten said it was useless and not worth recounting. Razali had tried to engage the Labor Minister on various subjects, to no avail.

111. (C) Despite the fact that Razali's UN handlers said there would be no meetings or briefings for diplomats, Razali did have some meetings with individual diplomats, including a private meeting with the Japanese ambassador and a three-way meeting with the French Ambassador and the German Charge. There was also a spur of the moment lunch with the Malaysian, Australian and Italian ambassadors.

112. (C) Comment: The fact that Razali came and met with ASSK twice is good - as is the news that she is even more open to dialogue with the regime. If the SPDC continues in the farce that she is not under house arrest or that she is "at home" voluntarily, then it will once again prove their callous insincerity. As to the PM's protests of wanting to do his best but being hog-tied by the Senior General, we should remain skeptical - especially after his alleged comment that "Maung Aye is with me." End Comment.
Martinez